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For most of the twentieth century. the dominant paradigm in comparative public law was
particutarism. This was accompanied by a strong skepticism towards universalist features
and possibilities in public Law and, especially, constitutional law. With the rise of judicial
review after World War I-and especially in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet
Union-comparative judicial review has begun to flourish. However, comparative scholar-
ship on judicial review overemphasizes the centrality of "the question of legitimacy" of
judicial review in a democratic polity. This has been a result of the mistaken extrapolation
of the American debate over judicial review to other countries. Examples from Canada,
South Africa, and Israel reveal that the question of legitimacy is, in each of these countries,
less important and decisively different in character than in the United States. It is therefore
time to recall and embrace some of the particularist skepticism when comparing judicial
review across different Legal systems.
Pendant [a majorit6 du XXe si~cLe, le particuLarisme repr~sente le paradigme dominant en
mati~re de droit public comparatif. Ceci s'accompagne dun fort scepticisme envers Les propri6-
t6s et possibilit6s universalistes en droit public, particuti~rement dans le droit constitutionnel.
Avec La mont~e de [a r6vision judiciaire apr6s La Seconde guerre mondiale, surtout en Europe
de 'Est apr~s l'effondrement de [Union sovi~tique, [a r6vision judiciaire comparative a commen-
c6 h s'6panouir. Toutefois, ['ensemble des recherches comparatives sur Ia r~vision judiciaire se
concentre excessivement sur [a centratit6 de o [a question de [a t6gitimit6 > de [a r6vision
judiciaire dans un r~gime d6mocratique. CeLa d~coute de ['extrapolation erron6e 6 d'autres
t This article is an outgrowth of a comment on Miguel Schor, "Mapping Comparative Judicial
Review" (Paper presented to the 2nd Osgoode Constitutional Law Roundtable: Comparative
Constitutional Law and Globalization - Towards Common Rights and Procedures,
Toronto, 24 February 2007). For the version of Professor Schor's paper that was later
published as an article, see infra note 9. Thank you to Professor Peer Zumbansen for inviting
me to participate in the Roundtable and to the participants for their insightful comments
throughout the day. Thank you also to Professors Jamie Cameron and Richard Goldstone
for providing comments on an earlier draft of this article.
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Common Law Section, University of Ottawa.
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pays du d~bat am6ricain concernant La revue judiciaire. L'exemple du Canada, de t'Afrique
du Sud et d'Israbt r6v tent que, dans chacun de ces pays, La question de la t6gitimit6 est moins
importante qu'aux Itats-Unis et pr6sente un caract6re vraiment diff6rent de ce pays. It est
temps par consequent de reprendre et d'adopter une petite mesure de scepticisme parti-
culariste torsque ['on compare La revue judiciaire de diff6rents syst&mes juridiques.
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UNTIL RELATIVELY RECENTLY, comparative law tended to be rather dubious
about the universalist possibilities of constitutional law. The dominant para-
digm in comparative public law until the late twentieth century was particularism.
It found expression in Montesquieu's skepticism: because of the belief that laws
must be appropriate to the people for whom they are made,1 he questioned
whether the laws of one nation could be suitable for another. Modern scholars
posited that the transfer of political institutions from one country to another
was simply not possible.2 On the basis that nations differ so much in their politi-
cal structures, social organizations, and legal cultures, it was contended by
constitutional particularists that the intimate connection between a nation and
its constitution meant that meaningful comparisons of constitutional law were
impossible.3 In a word, the historical nexus between public law and national
I. Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. by Anne M.
Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989) at 8-9.
2. See Carl J. Friedrich, The Impact ofAmerican Constitutionalism Abroad (Boston: Boston
University Press, 1967) at 10-11 (noting and critiquing this argument).
3. See Donald P. Kommers, "The Value of Comparative Constitutional Law" (1976) 9 J.
Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 685 at 688 ("It is possible to suggest that nations do differ to such
an extent in the details of their political structure, legal culture, or the wording of their
constitutions that no meaningful comparison of constitutional law across national
boundaries is possible"); Christopher Osakwe, "Introduction: The Problems of the
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identity may not readily transfer to other countries.' As a practical matter, the
leading comparativists in the twentieth century were private law scholars, and,
as a result, the field of comparative law was largely focused on this area. This
dominant particularist paradigm prevailed until the fall of the Soviet Union and
the subsequent explosion of scholarship in comparative constitutional law.
The reinvigoration of comparative law in the early 1990s brought with it
not only an exponential growth in comparative constitutional law scholar-
ship, but also the ascendancy of universalism over particularism within the
field. The words of one leading scholar best capture this school of thought:
"the basic principles of constitutional law are essentially the same around the
world."5 There are strong links between this universalist constitutionalism
and international human rights law.6
In addition, it is possible to identify both a "thick" and a "thin" version of
this universalism. Thick universalism contains both normative and process claims.
It posits the strong universal application of specific norms and values, as well as
a global network that facilitates the communication and reinforcement of these
values.7 In contrast, thin universalism presents a more modest argument about
universal values. Although it recognizes the existence of a global network of
Comparability of Notions in Constitutional Law" (1985) 59 Tul. L. Rev. 875 at 876 (stating
that "[p] ublic law reflects an inner relationship-a sort of spiritual and psychical
relationship-with the people over whom it operates").
4. See Osakw e, ibid. at 876.
5. David M. Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1995) at 10. See also at 15-17, 105, 142 (identifying these basic principles as
"proportionality" and "rationality").
6. See Mark Tushnet, "Some Reflections on Method in Comparative Constitutional Law" in
Sujit Choudhry, ed., The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006) 67 at 69.
7. For leading examples of thick universalism, see Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in
Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) (i.e., "purposive interpretation"); David
M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) (i.e., "ultimate
rule of law"); Lorraine E. Weinrib, "The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism"
in Choudhry, ibid., 84 (i.e., "postwar paradigm"); and Lorraine E. Weinrib, "Constitutional
Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism" in Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet,
eds., Defining the Field of Comparative Constitutional Law (Westport: Praeger, 2002) 3.
Other forms of universalism are referred to variously throughout the literature as "the
Convergence Model," "normative universalism," and the like. See Vicki C. Jackson,
"Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement" (2005) 119 Harv. L.
Rev. 109 at 112; Tushnet, ibid. at 68.
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courts as an interchange for ideas, its focus is more on the universal nature of
problems that courts face, rather than on the norms that should be applied. As
such, it is problem-based rather than norm-centred.8
In this article, I contend that it is time to recall and embrace some of the
particularist skepticism in comparing judicial review across legal systems. Miguel
Schor uses mapping as a metaphor for the process of organizing various ap-
proaches to the comparative analysis of judicial review around the world.9
Because comparativists have attempted to map the world's legal systems into
various legal families or traditions°-in much the same way that cartographers
once charted the continents and the oceans 1-this mapping metaphor has
been, at different times, frequently invoked in comparative law. It has also been
invoked literally, with one leading comparativist noting in 1998 that: "The le-
8. Anne-Marie Slaughter is the leading proponent of a thin universalism. See e.g. Anne-Marie
Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 1-15, 65-103.
9. Miguel Schor, "Mapping Comparative Judicial Review" (2008) 7 Wash. U. Global Stud.
L. Rev. 257.
10. See e.g. Ren6 David & John E.C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An
Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law, 2d ed. (New York: Free Press of Glencoe,
1978) (describing the idea of legal families and identifying the legal families in the world);
Konrad Zweigert & Heins Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 2d ed., trans. by Tony
Weir (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) at 63ff. (also describing the concept of, and
identifying, legal families); Mary Ann Glendon, Michael W. Gordon & Christopher
Osakwe, Comparative Legal Traditions in a Nutshell (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1982) at 4-5
(explaining that "[c]omparativists believe that the grouping of legal systems into legal
traditions or families is possible because within every national legal system there are certain
constants as well as certain variables" at 4, and identifying the "three major legal traditions in
the modern Western world" as "the Anglo-American common law tradition, the Romano-
Germanic civil law tradition and the socialist law tradition" at 5); and John Henry
Merryman & David S. Clark, Comparative Law, Western European and Latin American Legal
Systems: Cases and Materials (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1978) at 2 (identifying the three
principal legal traditions in the world as civil law, common law, and socialist law).
11. See e.g. Chester G. Hearn, Tracks in the Sea: Matthew Fontaine Maury and the Mapping of the
Oceans (Camden: International Marine, 2002); Robert Kunzig, Mapping the Deep: The
Extraordinary Story of Ocean Science (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000); Thomas Suirez,
Early Mapping of the Pacific: The Epic Story of Seafarers, Adventurers and Cartographers Who
Mapped the Earth's Greatest Ocean (North Clarendon: Periplus, 2004); and Nicholas Crane,
Mercator: The Man Who Mapped the Planet, 1st Amer. ed. (New York: Henry Holt, 2003).
See generally Nicholas Crane, The Map Book (Toronto: McArthur and Company, 2005). See
also Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The Power of Projections: How Maps Reflect Global Politics and
History (Westport: Praeger, 2006).
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gal map of the world today is not what it was in 1798, or in 1898, or even in
1989, and it no doubt will continue to change in the future."
12
Schor, however, departs from prior usage and proposes a different type of
conceptual map. Focusing on questions rather than phenomena, he maps out the
inquiries that have been made by scholars of comparative judicial review and then
assesses their answers. As a.general matter, he finds their explanations wanting;
they are often too polar or too reliant on single-variable explanations. In short,
Schor's map demonstrates that the answers provided by the 'conventional accounts
of judicial review are overstated. This is the theme that I will take up here. I will
focus, however, on the questions being asked rather than on their answers.
While Schor rightly takes existing scholarship to task for painting judicial
review with too broad a brush, I suggest that conventional accounts give judicial
review too much prominence. At times, the indomitable quest for a solution to
the conceptual "problem" of judicial review across different legal systems may
seek to resolve a non-existent problem. This emphasis on comparative judicial
review reveals the dominant theme in comparative law, especially in compara-
tive constitutional law: the tension between universalism and particularism.
Schor's article demonstrates how stressing judicial review overemphasizes its
importance as a universal phenomenon in a manner somewhat similar to how
our standard Mercator projection map centralizes and over-represents Europe
and North America at the expense of other continents.13 I endeavour to demon-
strate this argument by reflecting on a tale of two maps of my own.
I. A TALE OF TWO MAPS
A. THE FIRST MAP: THE MAPPARIUM
In Boston's Back Bay neighbourhood, there is an incredible map room like no
other. The "Mapparium" is located there, in the Mary Baker Eddy Library at
the headquarters of the Christian Science Center Publishing Society." The
12. Rudolf B. Schlesinger etal., Comparative Law: Cases, Text, Materials, 6th ed. (New York:
Foundation Press, 1998) at 283.
13. See Mark S. Monmonier, Rhumb Lines and Map Wars: A Social History of the Mercator
Projection (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).
14. Mary Baker Eddy was the founder of Christian Science as well as The Christian Science
Monitor in 1908. See generally Willa Cather, The Life ofMary Baker G. Eddy and the History
of Christian Science (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993).
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Mapparium is by no means a conventional map room (in the sense of a room
that contains maps where one can go and spread them out on a table for ex-
amination). Rather, the Mapparium is a map; it is a room that consists of a
single map-or, rather, a globe. This three-story room was built between 1934
and 1935, a time when the United States was in the midst of the turmoil of the
Great Depression and Hitler was on the rise in Europe. Designed by Boston
architect Chester Lindsay Churchill, the Mapparium was based on Rand
McNally's 1934 map of the world. To the visitor, it appears that the globe has
been turned inside out, with the map on the inside of the sphere. The visitor
stands inside the globe-three stories of it-and is able to peer at locations in
every direction. It is a full three hundred and sixty degree cartographical visual
experience. While some thought was apparently given to updating the map from
time to time,15 the futility and the expense of attempting to keep this particular
map of the world current meant that the Mapparium became frozen in time. 16
The visitor standing on the glass bridge of the observation deck, which trav-
erses the room from one end to the other, is propelled back in time to 1934.17
Great Britain, her colonies, and her mandates are in imperial pink, and other
"mother" countries also share a common colour with their colonies. The
Mapparium alters one's perspective, viewing the world in three-dimensional
terms from, as it were, the inside out. The oceans have different shades of blue to
denote depth-a frequent map feature that was critical for sailors, not to men-
tion divers. The Mapparium is a remarkable work of art, stimulating thought
about history, geography, politics, and, perhaps, about comparative law as well.
15. By the time the Mapparium was nearing completion in 1935, the world had changed from
that represented in Rand McNally's world map of 1934.
16. All references in this paragraph are based on a visit by the author to the Mapparium on 18
February 2007 and on the history of the Mapparium contained in its webpage. See The
Mary Baker Eddy Library for the Betterment of Humanity, "History of the Mapparium"
(2009), online: <http://www.marybakereddylibrary.org/exhibits/mappariumhistory.jhtml>.
According to the website: "In 1939, 1958, and again in 1966, different committees discussed
updating the map. In 1966, the estimated cost was $175,000 to create and install new glass
panels. It was decided that the Mapparium held much more value as an art object, and the
idea of updating was finally dropped."
17. The Mapparium is a three-dimensional encounter of experiencing maps as "a 'window' into
times now passed." Lez Smart, Maps That Made History: The Influential, the Eccentric and the
Suhlime (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2004) at 14.
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B. THE SECOND MAP: MR. FOSTER'S COLD WAR MAP
The second map fast-forwards five decades to the mid-1980s and my high
school social studies class in Vancouver (i.e., during the end of the Cold
War). Our class was taught by a relatively young and hippyish Mr. Dave Fos-
ter, who was one of those rare teachers able to capture the attention of
otherwise hormonally distracted fourteen-year-olds and succeed in inspiring a
few of them.
Mr. Foster showed us a map of how Americans perceived the world at that
time; it was a conceptual map more akin to the type we might use in compara-
tive law. Not surprisingly, the size and centrality of the United States was hugely
distorted. Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were similarly inflated and
described with the simple moniker "Commieland." The Middle East was
enlarged and labeled with the sole descriptor: "oil." Africa and South America
were shrunken, as was Canada, which was identified with the simple denotation
of "cold." Offering much of the same perspective, a similar map, entitled
"The World According to Ronald Reagan,"'" is available on the internet. It di-
vides the world into the "West (Us)" and the "East (Them)." Further, the United
States is divided into four regions: a hugely disproportionate California, a tiny
Northwest swath called "Ecotopia," an. oversized Northeast pocket called "De-
mocrats and other welfare bums," and a rump lying east of the Mississippi that is
coloured in red and white stripes and labeled "Republicans and other Real
Americans." Great Britain ("Thatcherland") is expanded beyond its normal size,
and Europe ("socialists and pacifists") lies in the red shadow of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which is referred to as "Godless Communists,
Liars and Spies."' 9
Mr. Foster's Cold War Map was a useful tool of engagement for the purpose
of articulating who the Americans saw in the world and how the Americans per-
18. "The World According to Ronald Reagan," online: <http://strangemaps.wordpress.com/
2006/11123/38-the-world-according-to-ronald-reaganl>; humor.beecy.net <http://humor.
beecy.netlmisclworldl>.
19. For example, in this map, Canada is grey and labelled "Acidrainia," Mexico is simply
"Mariachi Land," and a tiny South America-or "Bananaland"-is about the same size as
the Falkland Islands. The Middle East is divided into Israel and "Our Oil," and Beirut is the
only city in the region that is noted. Africa is shrunken. Asia is simply "Their China," and
appears to be roughly the same size as "Our China." See ibid.
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ceived these others.20 It was a simplistic depiction of what international relations
theorists would describe in more conceptual terms as a bi-polar international
system, almost to a reductio ad absurdum. But in presenting the Cold War Map's
view of a bi-polar world through the eyes of one superpower (we might imagine
*a similar exercise from the Soviet perspective), the map is also notable for what
it omitted. The Cold War Map sees the United States at the centre of a world
struggle, and, in dividing the world into "us" and "them," the perspectives of
the "others" are literally diminished or excluded from the map altogether.
What is the connection between my two maps and Professor Schor's mapping
of comparative judicial review? It is this: in our own conceptual mapping of judi-
cial review, we tend to exaggerate the importance of the problem of the
legitimacy of judicial review in constitutionalism. Like Mr. Foster's Cold War
Map or "The World According to Ronald Reagan," we, as comparative
constitutional scholars, tend to view the centrality of judicial review through
the prism of the American experience. By universalizing "the problem" of
judicial review from the American experience, we may be creating a false
positive in some constitutional systems, while creating a false negative in others,
and also missing other important features and elements in constitutional
systems because of our collective fixation on judicial review.
II. FROM THE PARTICULAR TO THE UNIVERSAL OR
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM?
Comparative judicial review extrapolates the well-developed theoretical issues
from the American context and applies them universally. A number of factors
should cause us to question the extent to which the concerns raised in the
American context have broader universal application. As a starting point, the
burgeoning literature on American exceptionalism gives us reason to treat ex-
trapolations from the American experience in judicial review with some degree
of skepticism.21 In particular, we should begin by acknowledging the origins of
20. For a modern version of "The World According to Ronald Reagan," see the depiction of
"The World According to Dubya," online: <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2006/1 1/
16/8490/2873>.
21. On American exceptionalism, see e.g. Michael Ignatieff, ed., American Exceptionalism and
Human Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Seymour Martin Lipset,
American Exceptionalism: A Double-edged Sword (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Siobhan
DODEK, A TALE OF TWO MAPS 295
judicial review in the United States, the centrality and persistence of the debate
over its legitimacy, and the politicized nature of that debate.
Judicial review was born in the United States. The United States contributed a
distinct conception of constitutionalism to the international community, consisting
of judicially enforceable rights grounded in the power of judicial review." The text
of the American Constitution, however, is silent on the issue, and it was not until
1803, in Marbury v. Madison,2" that Chief Justice Marshall declared the existence
of the power of judicial review. This power was not exercised for half a century, until
the infamous Dred Scott decision. 24 As a result, it has been said that judicial review
McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End
of the Cold War (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Deborah Madsen, American Exceptionalism
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1998); Jack P. Greene, The Intellectual Construction
ofAmerica: Exceptionalism and Identity from 1492 to 1800 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1993); and Harold Hongju Koh, "Foreword: On American Exceptionalism"
(2003) 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1479.
22. See Louis Henkin, TheAge of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) at x-xi, 65
("The United States is commonly acknowledged to be a principal ancestor of the contemporary
idea of rights" at 65). See also Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America's Vision
for Human Rights (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005). On
the American contribution of the Declaration of Independence to the global community,
see David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2007). On the American conception of rights, see Lynn Hunt,
Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: W.W. Hunt, 2007) at 113-26, 214.
23. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
24. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) [Dred Scott]. Many scholars characterize
Dred Scott as "infamous" or "notorious." See e.g. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution
Away from the Courts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) at 8 [Tushnet, Taking]
(calling Dred Scott "notorious"); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting ofAmerica: The Political
Seduction of the Law (New York: Touchstone, 1990) at 28 (Bork, Tempting] (calling Dred
Scott "the worst constitutional decision of the nineteenth century" under the heading "Chief
Justice Taney and Dred Scot. The Court Invites a Civil War"); Bruce Ackerman, We the
People, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991) at 63, 64
(characterizing Dred Scott as "the single darkest stain upon the Court's checkered history" at
63, and calling Dred Scott "moral evil" at 64); Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1984) at 185 (calling Dred Scott "infamous" and stating that "[n]o
decision in the Court's long history has been so thoroughly reviled, then and now"); Charles
Fried, Saying What the Law Is: The Constitution in the Supreme Court (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2004) at 172 (terming Dred Scott "notorious"); and John Hart
Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory ofJudicial Review (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1980) at 16 (characterizing Dred Scott as "probably more notorious" than
the decision of Wynehamer v. The People of New York, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856)).
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in the United States was "born in sin. '2 What is critical for comparative pur-
poses is that judicial review originated with the Supreme Court, not with
democratically elected representatives, and not within the text of the Consti-
tution itself.
In the United States, the persistence of the debate over the legitimacy of
judicial review is notable, as is the centrality of that debate. Former Stanford
Dean of Law, Paul Brest, has rightly called "the controversy over the legitimacy
of judicial review in a democratic polity ... the historic obsession of normative
constitutional law scholarship" in the United States.26 Since before and after
Herbert Wechsler's endeavour at articulating neutral principles,27 American
constitutional law scholars have embarked on a collective quest for a theory of
interpretation to justify judicial review. They include formalists,28 neo-
formalists, 29 originalists," textualists,3 process-theorists,32 moral theorists,33
25. Lino A. Graglia, "Constitutional Law Without the Constitution: The Supreme Court's
Remaking of America" in Robert H. Bork, ed., A Country IDo Not Recognize: The Legal
Assault on American Values (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2005) 1 at 8.
26. Paul Brest, "The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship" (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1063 at 1063. See also Roger P.
Alford, "In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism" (2005) 52 UCLA L. Rev.
639 (claiming that "constitutional law scholars [are] obsessed with the latest nuance of a
grand constitutional theory" at 644).
27. Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" (1959) 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1.
28. See e.g. James B. Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law" (1893) 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129.
29. See e.g. Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal
Interpretation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
30. See e.g. Bork, Tempting, supra note 24; Antonin Scalia, "Originalism: The Lesser Evil"
(1989) 57 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 849.
31. See e.g. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law: An Essay
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
32. See e.g. Ely, supra note 24; Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Frank Michelman, "Law's Republic"
(1988) 97 Yale L.J. 1493.
33. See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1977); Ronald Dworkin, A Matter ofPrinciple (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1985); Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1986); David A.J. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (New York:
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populists,"4 pragmatists,5 judicial minimalists,36 and many others.37 There are
also those who address the legitimacy of judicial review by calling for its aboli-
tion or its severe curtailment.38
The American debate over the legitimacy of judicial review must be con-
sidered in its larger political context. American constitutionalism is deeply
entrenched in American political culture as acceptance of the idea of the
Constitution as a limit on the power of the state. In fact, constitutionalism
in the United States is considered by some to be a form of secular religion.39
The exercise of judicial review, however, as a component of constitutional-
ism-that is, the power of the judiciary to strike down legislation as
inconsistent with the Constitution-is not similarly entrenched. To put the
matter in starker terms, the constitutional debate over the ratification of the
Constitution that led Publius to pen The Federalist Papers is now a matter of
Oxford University Press, 1986); and Michael J. Perry, The Constitution in the Courts: Law or
Politics? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
34. See e.g. Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Ackerman, supra note 24, vols. 1, 2; and
Tushnet, Taking, supra note 24. See also Richard D. Parker, "Here, the People Rule" A
Constitutional Populist Manifesto (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
35. See e.g. Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2003); Richard A. Posner, "Pragmatic Adjudication" in Morris Dickstein,
ed., The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1998) 235; and Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting our
Democratic Constitution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005).
36. See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard.University Press, 1999).
37. Critical legal scholars have sought to undermine efforts to develop such a theory and some
have argued for the abolition of judicial review. See e.g. Gerald E. Frug, "A Critical Theory
of Law" (1989) 1 Legal Educ. Rev. 43; Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal
Studies Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); Mark Tushnet,
"Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction" (1984) 36
Stan. L. Rev. 623; and Tushnet, Taking, supra note 24.
38. See Tushnet, Taking, ibid. (calling for the abolition of judicial review); Graglia, supra note
25 at 52-53 (also calling for the abolition of judicial review); and Robert H. Bork,
Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism andAmerican Decline (New York: Regan
Books, 1996) at 117 [Bork, Slouching] (proposing a constitutional amendment that would
make any federal or state court decision subject to being overruled by a majority vote in
each House of Congress).
39. See e.g. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
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history. There are vibrant debates on the meaning and interpretation of the
US Constitution, but not about the validity of the document itself. This is
not the case with judicial review; its legitimacy continues to be questioned
and debated.
The legitimacy of the judicial role was an issue that first confronted the fram-
ers of the US Constitution, and it continues to define American constitutionalism
today. The problem of legitimacy arises because of the apparent conflict between
the concept of judicial review and the principle of democratic accountability. In
simple terms, the- principle of democratic accountability holds that decisions relat-
ing to government policymaking, which inevitably require choosing between
competing values, be made by persons who are accountable to the electorate.".
A person may be either directly or indirectly accountable to the electorate. As
explained by Michael Perry:
[A] person is accountable to the electorate directly if he holds elective office for a
designated, temporary period.and can remain in office beyond that period only by
winning reelection; accountability is indirect if he holds appointive office and can
remain in office only at the discretion of his appointer (who in turn is electorally
accountable) or, if his office is for a designated, temporary period, by securing re-
appointment after that period has expired.
Elected representatives, therefore, are directly accountable, and many of
their officials are indirectly accountable. A life-tenured judiciary, however, is
neither. Given the principle of democratic accountability, the question must
therefore arise about the legitimacy of judicial review."2 That quest for justifica-
tion, which has been the defining feature of American constitutional thought in
the twentieth century, was set off by Alexander Bickel's characterization of judi-
40. Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts and Human Rights: An Inquiry into the
Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by the Judiciary (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1982) at 9.
We in the United States are philosophically committed to the political principle that
government policymaking-by which I mean simply decisions as to which values among
competing values shall prevail, and as to how those values shall be implemented-ought to
be subject to control by persons accountable to the electorate. [footnotes omitted]
41. Ibid. [emphasis iri original; footnotes omitted].
42. See ibid. For a leading article of this genre, see Eugene V. Rostow, "The Democratic
Character of Judicial Review" (1952) 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193.
DODEK. A TALE OF TWO MAPS 299
cial review as a "deviant institution"4 3 in American democracy and his definition
of the problem in terms of the "counter-majoritarian difficulty." '4 To this effect,
Cappelletti referred to the "Mighty Problem" of judicial review." I refer to this
debate around judicial review's legitimacy simply as "the Question of Legiti-
macy" in comparative constitutionalism.
The Question of Legitimacy in the United States is notable for its cen-
trality, its intensity, and its endurance. It is a dominating issue
jurisprudentially, academically, and politically. In this sense, the Question of
Legitimacy continues to be more of a concern in the United States than in
many other countries that have explicitly adopted what might be termed
"American-style judicial review." It has been sustained and, perhaps, elevated
by the politicized nature of the appointment process of US Supreme Court
justices. Although there is a political element to the judicial appointment
process in all countries," what distinguishes the American judicial appoint-
ment process is the extent to which it is caught up in partisan politics.
American judicial nominees are part of American political theatre and are
used as pawns in political inter-party and sometimes intra-party political
warfare. The effect has been to sustain and nurture the debate over the
Question of Legitimacy in the political sphere, and this ensures a continuing
market for academic writings on the issue.
The Question of Legitimacy should properly be considered an aspect of
American exceptionalism, as part of the growing discourse on the uniqueness of
the United States in international relations, human rights, and political theory.47
While discussing his decision to exclude the United States from a book entitled
Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives,
Philip Alston explained that:
43. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962) at 16.
44. Ibid. at 18.
45. See Mauro Cappelletti, "The 'Mighty Problem' of Judicial Review and the Contribution of
Comparative Analysis" (1980) 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 409.
46. See e.g. Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell, eds., AppointingJudges in an Age ofJudicial
Power: Critical Perspectives from Around the World (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2006).
47. See sources cited, supra note 21.
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The American Bill of Rights is, in many ways, suigeneris. Because it is in a class of its
own, experience under it offers fewer insights and less guidance than is usually assumed
to those who are curious about the viability or optimal shape of bills of rights else-
where in the world."8
As I argue below, the Question of Legitimacy in the United States is also sui
generis. It has taken on a very different tenor in other legal systems.
III. THREE ALTERNATE ACCOUNTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY
In this section, I describe judicial review in Canada, Israel, and South Africa. In
each case, judicial review operates within the rubric of a common law system
that is very much cognizant of the American model of judicial review. I argue,
however, that the nature of judicial review in these three countries differs sig-
nificantly from that in the United States, and that the Question of Legitimacy
has taken on a very different character in each of them.
With these countries, .1 examine judicial review on three continents (while a
representative from Europe is noticeably absent"9). This review is by no means
intended to be exhaustive, but rather informative of the nature of the debate on
judicial review outside the United Stares. Th us, the experiences of these three
countries, taken together, provide a cautionary tale about universalizing judicial
review from the American experience. In each example, we can identify differences
of history and context, constitutional structure, and legal culture that reduce the
centrality of the Question of Legitimacy in comparison to the United States.
A. CANADA NOTWITHSTANDING
We might expect the characteristics of judicial review in Canada to most resemble
the United States because of the geographic proximity of the countries, shared
cultural and language bonds, and strong commonalities between the legal systems.
Further, many Canadian lawyers, judges, public servants, and public policy makers
48. Philip Alston, "A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Bills of Rights" in Philip
Alston, ed., Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 1 at 6.
49. On judicial review in Europe, see e.g. Cappelletti, supra note 45; Alec Stone Sweet, "Why
Europe Rejected American Judicial Review - And Why It May Not Matter" (2003) 101
Mich. L. Rev. 2744.
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have done graduate work in the United States. However, the Canadian narrative and
debate over the Question of Legitimacy differ significantly from the US experience.
To begin, historical differences between Canada and the United States are
critical. Canadians never declared their independence from Great Britain, but
rather came together to form a union under the continued aegis of the mother
country, expressly seeking a constitution "similar in principle" to it.5" Canada's
original Constitution-the British North America Act, 186 76 1-argely set out
the federal structure of the new dominion and contained few express rights.
While it is arguable that the federal government, and not the courts, was envi-
sioned as the arbiter of the boundaries of federal-provincial powers, the courts
soon took on this role.52 In Canada's first century, therefore, judicial review was
about federalism. 3 Until the enactment of a constitutionally entrenched bill of
rights in 1982, the dominant theme in constitutional debates over judicial re-
view focused on the proper scope of power to be given to the federal and
provincial governments.54
In 1960, Canada adopted a statutory bill of rights.55 Its impact, however,
was limited: it applied only to the federal government and not to the provinces,
50. Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, Preamble, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
App. II, No. 5 [Constitution Act, 1867].
51. This was re-enacted and renamed the Constitution Act, 1867, ibid.
52. In the years following Confederation, the provincial courts and the Privy Council assumed
the power to review the validity of legislation that had been enacted by the provincial
legislatures and the federal Parliament. This was done in order to ensure compliance of the
legislation with the B.N.A. Act. See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed.
(Scarborough: Thomson Carswell, 2007), s. 5.5(a) at 5-24.
53. Schor acknowledges that judicial review first developed in federal systems-i.e., the United
States-because of the need to arbitrate between federal and state (or provincial) powers. See
Schor, supra note 9 at 262:
Judicial review was designed to knit the nation together by counterbalancing the pressures
exerted by federalism. The framers understood.that the national government needed a mechanism
that would bind the states to the Constitution. The Supreme Court and the Supremacy
Clause were intended to prevent centrifugal forces from tearing the new nation apart... . The
American experience suggests an affinity between judicial review and federalism.
54. See e.g. Frank R. Scott, Essays on the Constitution: Aspects of Canadian Law and Politics
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977); Robert MacGregor Dawson, ed.,
Constitutional Issues in Canada, 1900-1931 (London: Oxford University Press, 1933).
55. Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44.
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and it was given a very narrow interpretation by the courts.56 Only once in
two-and-a-half decades did the Supreme Court of Canada exercise the power of
judicial review to strike down legislation that it found to be inconsistent with
the Canadian Bill of Rights.57 The failure of the Supreme Court of Canada to
exercise judicial review under the Bill of Rights, as well as the lack of hesita-
tion of the Warren Court to do so south of the border, provided an important
backdrop for Canada's enactment of a constitutional bill of rights-the Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms58 -in 1982. To this effect, "Canada's
adoption of the Charter ... was a.conscious decision to increase the scope of
judicial review. ""
Key structural characteristics differentiate the Canadian Constitution from its
American counterpart on the Question of Legitimacy. In a critical distinction from
the American Constitution, which is silent on the question, Canada's Constitu-
tion Act, 198260 expressly bestowed upon the courts the power of judicial
review. Section 52(1) of that act provides that: "The Constitution of Canada is
the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions
of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."61
Further, section 24(1) of the Charter provides that "[a]nyone whose rights or
freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may ap-
ply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court
considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.""2 This express textual
authorization for judicial review in the Canadian Constitution significantly
distinguishes it from American constitutionalism, and, on its own, it could also be
seen to largely resolve the question of the legitimacy of judicial review under
56. See generally Walter Surma Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill ofRights, 2d ed. (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1975); Hogg, supra note 52, s. 35.5 at 35-10, 35-12.
57. SeeR. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282.
58. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c.1 [Charter].
59. Hogg, supra note 52, s. 5.5(b) at 5-30.
60. The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[Constitution Act, 1982].
61. Ibid., s. 52(1). See Hogg, supra note 52, s. 5.5(a) at 5-25 ("Section 52(1) is the current basis
of judicial review in Canada"), s. 40.1 (b) at 40-2 ("s. 52(1) provides an explicit basis for
judicial review of legislation in Canada").
62. Charter, supra note 58, s. 24(1).
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Canada's Constitution. In the words of Canada's leading constitutional law
scholar: "much of the American debate over the legitimacy of judicial review is
rendered irrelevant."63 However, Canadian attempts to address this issue do not
end here.
When a judicially-enforced bill of rights was being debated in Canada
between 1979 and 1981, the American experience with judicial review and the
counter-majoritarian dilemma were very much front and centre in the discus-
sion. Opponents of what might be termed "American-style judicial review"
feared giving courts, through the process of constitutional interpretation, the
final say-always-in the determination of important public policy issues.
Their opposition to a constitutional bill of rights was tempered by the federal
government s agreement to insert into the Charter a "notwithstanding clause"
that would allow provincial legislatures (as well as the federal Parliament) to
"override" certain provisions of the Charter (and thereby immunize legislation
from judicial review) for a limited period of time." The attraction found adher-
ents among provincial premiers-at opposite ends of the political spectrum-
who generally opposed constitutional entrenchment of a bill of rights.65
Because the notwithstanding clause gives the popular representatives of
the people the final say in constitutional matters, its existence is seen by many
to conclusively resolve any apparent counter-majoritarian difficulty in the Cana-
dian context." It means that courts do not have a conclusive veto over legislatures.
As Peter Hogg explains, if an equivalent to Canada's notwithstanding clause ex-
isted under the US Constitution, Roosevelt would likely have used it during
the New Deal in response to the Lochner-era decisions, thus averting his
court-packing plan." The conceptual success of Canada's notwithstanding
63. Hogg, supra note 52, s. 39.8 at 39-12. See also Christopher P. Manfredi, Judicial Power and
the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism, 2d ed. (Don Mills: Oxford
University Press, 2001) at 11-12 ("[T]he basic legitimacy of judicial review has been less
controversial in Canada for both historical and structural reasons").
64. See Charter, supra note 58, s. 33.
65. See generally Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic
Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 56-59.
66. See e.g. Manfredi, supra note 63 at 188-95 (arguing that the notwithstanding mechanism
promotes democratic legitimacy); Janet Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament's Role?
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002).
- 67. Hogg, supra note 52, s. 36.4(d), n. 44 at 36-12 (also noting that some decisions of the
Warren Court would have likely been overridden by the government of the day).
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mechanism as a response to the Question of Legitimacy, by providing a possible
"third way" between parliamentary supremacy and judicial supremacy, is perhaps
demonstrated by the support that it has found among some of the strongest
critics of judicial review in the United States.68
While the notwithstanding clause may address the Question of Legitimacy
in theory, it has, however, become politically illegitimate in practice,6 9 and has
not been used since the late 1980s."° That is to say, most of the experience under
the Charter has been without the operation of the notwithstanding clause. As a
consequence, the debate around judicial review has moved to one about judicial
activism and the proper relationship between the courts and the legislature. This
68. See Bork, Slouching, supra note 38 at 117 (proposing a constitutional amendment that would
make any federal or state court decision subject to overrule by a majority vote in each House
of Congress). On Bork's wavering about the idea of a legislative override, see Robert H.
Bork, Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule ofJudges (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2002) at 76-
78. See also Mark R. Levin, Men in Black: How the Supreme Court is Destroying America
(Washington: Regnery, 2005) at 202 (proposing a legislative veto over court decisions
through a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress).
69. The notwithstanding clause soon became caught up in the longest-standing Canadian
political dispute between English and French Canada-when it was invoked by the
government of Quebec in response to a Supreme Court decision that held as
unconstitutional certain prohibitions on the use of languages other than French. See Ford v.
Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712. For a time, the Quebec legislature included
the notwithstanding clause in every piece of legislation that it passed as a sign of protest
against the exclusion of Quebec from the 1982 constitutional deal. As a result, the
notwithstanding clause, which could have given a very different character to judicial review
in Canada, quickly became the bite noire of Canadian constitutional politics. The literature
on the notwithstanding clause is vast. See Hogg, supra note 52, s. 39.1, n.1 at 39-1
(providing a list of articles on this topic). On the rise and decline of the notwithstanding
clause, see Manfredi, supra note 63 at 181-88.
70. It is arguable that a constitutional convention has developed or is developing against the use
of the notwithstanding clause. In the 2006 federal election, Prime Minister Paul Martin
promised that if his government were to be re-elected, it would introduce legislation that
would prohibit the federal government from using the notwithstanding clause. See "Martin
Wraps Campaign in Constitutional Pledge," CBCNews (10 January 2006), online:
<http://www.cbc.calstory/canadavotes2006/national/2006/0 1/09/elxn-debates-look.html>.
See also Paul Wells, Right Side Up: The Fall of Paul Martin and the Rise of Stephen Harper's
New Conservatism (Toronto: Douglas Gibson, 2006) at 220-22. Professor Allan Hutchinson
suggested to me that the lapse of time in the use of the notwithstanding clause may suffice to
qualify it for desuetude along the lines of the long-lapsed constitutional powers of
disallowance and reservation. For a comparable analysis on the constitutional power of
disallowance, which has not been invoked since 1943, see Hogg, ibid., s. 5.3(e) at 5-19.
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shift has spawned a vast literature on the subject, focusing.most prominently since
the late 1990s on the concept of "dialogue" between the courts and the legislatures.71
Canadian constitutional scholarship since 1982 reflects a sustained critique
of the effect of the Charter. The critics come from both the left 2 and the right 3
sides of the political spectrum, and their criticisms focus, either explicitly or
implicitly, on the constitutionalization of rights. Scholars and "commentators
often exaggerate the political impact of judicial review"1 in this process. The
Canadian debate is not about the legitimacy of judicial review per se, but about
its proper scope and the role of the courts. In contrast to American constitu-
tional scholarship, Canadian attempts at grand theoretical justification for
71. See Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35
Osgoode Hall L.J. 75. Hogg & Bushell's dialogue theory spurned a cottage industry of
commentary. See F.L. Morton, "Dialogue or Monologue?" (April 1999) Policy Options 23;
Janet L. Hiebert, "Why Must a Bill of Rights be a Contest of Political and Judicial Wills?"
(1999) 10 Public L. Rev. 22; Christopher P: Manfredi & James B. Kelly, "Six Degrees of
Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 513; Peter W.
Hogg & Allison A. Thornton-Bushell, "Reply to 'Six Degrees of Dialogue"' (1999) 37
Osgoode Hall L.J. 529. To commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Hogg & Bushell
article, the Osgoode Hall Law Journal published a special issue on "Charter Dialogue: Ten
Years Later." For the opening article, see Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton &
Wade K. Wright, "Charter Dialogue Revisited-Or 'Much Ado About Metaphors"' (2007)
45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1. This issue also includes commentaries by Richard Haigh & Michael
Sobkin, Grant Huscroft, Christopher Manfredi, Carissima Mathen, Andrew Petter, and
Kent Roach, and a reply from Hogg, Bushell & Wright. The Supreme Court of Canada has
embraced the concept of dialogue. See e.g. Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 at paras.
137-39, 178; M. v. H, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 328; Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of
Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 at para. 116; R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R.
668 at paras. 20, 57, 125; Little Sisters Book &Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister oflustice),
[2000] 2 S.C.R 1120 at para. 268; Bell ExpressVu v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 at paras. 65-
66; and Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 at para. 37.
72. See e.g. Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada, rev. ed.
(Toronto: Thomson Educational, 1994); Allan C. Hutchinson, Waitingfor Coraf A Critique
of Law and Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); and Joel Bakan, Just Words:
Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
73. See e.g. F.L. Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000).
74. Hogg, supra note 52, s. 36.4(b) at 36-9. See also Peter W. Hogg, "The Charter Revolution: Is it
Undemocratic?" (2001) 12 Const. F. 1; Robin Elliot, "'The Charter Revolution and the Court
Party': Sound Critical Analysis or Blinkered Political Polemic?" (2002) 35 U.B.C. L. Rev. 271.
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judicial review are exceedingly rare.7" For the Charter's first fifteen years, the
debate was largely between a small cadre of scholars on the left-who viewed
the courts as, essentially, conservative power structures that are unlikely to fos-
ter progressive social change-and a similarly small group of critics on the right,
who continued to fight for deference to the parliamentary supremacy that had
been abandoned as a conscious policy choice with the adoption of the Charter.
The large majority of constitutional scholars supported the Charter project. Since
the late 1990s, the debate has changed somewhat, focusing on "judicial activ-
ism" (and what that means) and whether or not Canadian courts are activist.
76
The original Charter critics have remained, adapting their stances somewhat. A
growing number of Charter supporters, however, have lamented the courts'
failure to exercise judicial review more aggressively and more frequently.
In sum, the debate in Canada has not been over the threshold question of
the democratic legitimacy of judicial review, but rather over its appropriate
scope and boundaries. Moreover, this debate has largely been confined to legal
and academic circles, and it only infrequently enters the public forum in the
manner that it does in the United States. Professor Hogg has explained that:
The controversy about the political role of the [Supreme Court of Canada] has
mainly taken place in academic journals, books and conferences. The public con-
troversy about the role of the highest court that has become the standard fare of
politics in the United States is muted and sporadic in Canada. It is not clear whether
this is because Canadians are more respectful of their Court, or because they are
less disturbed by the anti-majoritarian outcomes. It may be a bit of both.77
75. For one such early account, see Patrick Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter,
Federalism, and the Supreme Court of Canada (Agincourt: Carswell, 1987). See also David M.
Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1995); David M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
76. For a symposium on this matter, see Policy Options (April 1999) at 3-4, 8-37 (the issue is entitled
"Are Judges Too Powerful?"). See e.g William Watson, "From the Editor's Desktop: Who's Got
the Power?" (April 1999) Policy Options 3; Bertha Wilson, "We Didn't Volunteer" (April 1999)
Policy Options 8; Peter H. Russell, "Reform's judicial agenda" (April 1999) Policy Options 12;
Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Thorton, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures"
(April 1999) Policy Options 19; Morton-, supra note 71; Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, "The
Activist Constitution" (April 1999) Policy Options 27; Rainer Knopff, "Courts Don't Make
Good Compromises" (April 1999) Policy Options 31; and S~bastien Lebel-Grenier, "La
charte et la legitimation de I'activisme judiciaire" (April 1999) Policy Options 35.
77. Hogg, supra note 52, s. 36.4(b) at 36-9 [emphasis in original].
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The legitimacy of judicial review under the Charter is generally accepted in
Canada and Canadians are not particularly interested in debating the subject,
one way or the other.78
B. SOUTH AFRICA'S CONSCIOUS EMBRACE OF RIGHTS
In South Africa, the Question of Legitimacy is even more muted than in Can-
ada. Under apartheid, judicial review was almost non-existent.79 Anti-apartheid
activists and legal scholars generally expressed frustration or indictment with the
general failure of the judiciary to protect the rights and freedoms of apartheid's
victims.8" The South African debate over the legitimacy of judicial review is
largely a historical one. Attempts by the white liberal opposition during the
apartheid years to enact a bill of rights with judicial review failed. The apartheid
government used the bogeyman of Lochner as part of its justification for oppos-
ing judicial review. Initially, the African National Congress (ANC) opposed
judicial review, preferring instead to rely on the principle of unfettered majori-
tarianism. However, as the anti-apartheid struggle increasingly became
embedded in the international human rights movement, the ANC embraced
the enactment of a constitutional bill of rights enforced through the exercise of
judicial review. By the time of the constitutional negotiations of the early
1990s, as Schor recognizes, both black and white South Africans supported the
establishment of judicial review and the constitutionalization of rights-
although for different reasons. For Black South Africans-represented to the
78. The attempt by Prime Minister Martin to inject a debate over the use of the notwithstanding
clause into the 2006 Canadian election was largely considered an act of political desperation
and not a subject in which the public was particularly interested. See Wells, supra note 70 at
221-22 (stating that Prime Minister Martin "had reached out to an incredibly narrow target
demographic," and the proposal "excited almost no Canadian").
79. The only exercise of judicial review occurred in the 1950s in a constitutional crisis over
entrenched provisions of the South Africa Act, 1909, which functioned as South Africa's
Constitution between 1910 and 1960. On these events, see generally John Dugard, "Toward
Racial Justice in South Africa" in Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal, eds., Constitutionalism
and Rights: The Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1990) 349 at 357-62; Henry John May, The South African Constitution, 3d ed.
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1955) at 50-56; and T.RH. Davenport, South Africa: A Modem
History, 4th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) at 329-43.
80. See e.g. John Dugard, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1978); David Dyzenhaus, Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth,
Reconciliation and the Apartheid Legal Order (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998).
308 (20091 47 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
largest degree by the ANC-a constitutional bill of rights anchored in the
power of judicial review became almost an article of faith. White South Africans
became quick converts to a constitutional bill of rights backed by judicial review
as a means to protect their minority rights and defacto privileges.81
The structure of the South African Constitution also severely diminishes the
Question of Legitimacy. The interim Constitution that governed the transition
from apartheid to democracy explicitly provided, in the clearest of language, for
the establishment of a Constitutional Court that would have the power to declare
legislation invalid to the extent of its inconsistency with the Constitution;82 further,
it made any such declaration binding on all executive, legislative, and judicial
organs of the state.83 This interim Constitution also contained a supremacy
clause that declared the Constitution to be "the supreme law of the Republic
and any law or act inconsistent with its provisions shall, unless otherwise pro-
vided expressly or by necessary implication in this Constitution, be of no force
and effect to the extent of the inconsistency." ' Similar provisions were carried
over into the final Constitution that now operates in South Africa.85
While the Canadian Charter exerted significant influence on the drafting of
the South African Bill of Rights,86 the framers of South Africa's Constitution
chose not to adopt a notwithstanding clause. Given the rarity of such provisions
in constitutions around the world, as well as the apartheid-era concern (of the
81. See African National Congress, Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa
(1988), reprinted as Appendix B in Albie Sachs, "Towards a Bill of Rights for a Democratic
South Africa" (1989) 12 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 289 at 322-24; Albie Sachs,
Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990).
82. See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No. 200 of 1993, s. 98(5), (3) [interim
Constitution].
83. Ibid., s. 98(4).
84. Ibid., s. 4.
85. See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No. 108 of 1996, ss. 1 (the founding values),
2 (the supremacy of the Constitution), 167 (the jurisdiction and powers of the
Constitutional Court) [Constitution].
86. See D.M. Davis, "Constitutional Borrowing: The Influence of Legal Culture and Local
History on the Reconstitution of Comparative Influence: The South African Experience"
(2003) 1 Int'l J. Const. L. 181 at 186-87, 191; Jeremy Sarkin, "The Effect of Constitutional
Borrowings on the Drafting of South Africa's Bill of Rights and Interpretation of Human
Rights Provisions" (1998) 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 176 at 181, 196, n. 154. See generally Adam
M. Dodek, "The Protea and the Maple Leaf: The Impact of the Charter on South African
Constitutionalism" (2004) 17 N.J.C.L. 353.
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white elite) that unbridled parliamentary supremacy would fail to protect the
rights and freedoms of unpopular groups, this omission is unsurprising. How-
ever, considering the ability of the South African Parliament to amend most
of the Constitution with a two-thirds vote87-a figure that the ANC has ei-
ther obtained or very nearly obtained in the four elections since 1994 5 -no
notwithstanding mechanism has been required to keep the legislature in the
constitutional conversation; the ANC government has often been in a position
to obtain the requisite voting weight to amend the Constitution.89 Moreover,
because of this relative ease with which the South African Parliament may
87. See Constitution, supra note 85, s. 74(2), (3) (providing that most provisions of the
Constitution can be amended by a two-thirds vote of the National Assembly and the support
of at least six (of nine) provinces). Furthermore, s. 74(1) requires that provisions to amend
the founding provisions of the Constitution (c. 1) and the amendment provision itself,
require a support level of at least 75 per cent.
88. In the 1994 election, the ANC alone received 252 of 400 seats (63 per cent). An additional
16 votes were required to reach the threshold of two-thirds that was necessary for
amendment of the Constitution (i.e., 268 of 400 seats). This could have been achieved with
the addition of either partner in the Government of National Unity: the National Party (82
seats) or the Inkatha Freedom Party (43 seats). See Independent Electoral Commission of
South Africa, "Results of Past Elections: Elections '94," online: <http://www.elections.org.za/
Elections94.asp>. In 1999, the ANC received 66.35 per cent of the national vote, just short
of the two-thirds required to amend the Constitution on its own. See Independent Electoral
Commission of South Africa, "National Elections '99: National Results," online:
<http:I/www.elections.org.zalresults/natperparty.asp>. In 2004, however, the ANC did
obtain the two-thirds necessary to amend the Constitution without the support of any other
parties when it received 69.69 per cent of the vote. See Independent Electoral Commission
of South Africa, "National & Provincial Elections 2004: Election Results," online:
<http://www.elections.org.za/Elections2004-Static.asp?radR~sult=45>. In the April 2009
elctions, the ANC received 65.9 per cent of the national vote, which, although down from
2004 and 1999, remained up from the first elections in 1994. This translated into 264 of
400 seats in the National Assembly. See Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa,
"Seat Reports: Seat Calculation Report," online: <http://www.elections.org.za/
NPEPWStaticReports/reports/ReportParameters.aspxcatid=9>.
89. The leading text on South African constitutional law states: "despite its considerable
majorities in the national legislature, the ANC has not, as yet, used its legislative power to
enact, major changes to the negotiated peace settlement reflected in our Interim Constitution
and our Final Constitution." Stu Woolman & Jonathan Swanepoel, "Constitutional
History" in Stuart Woolman, Theunis Roux & Michael Bishop, eds., Constitutional Law of
South Africa, 2d ed. (Cape Town: Juta, 2008) 2.1 at 2.46-2.47.
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currently amend the Constitution,90 the problem of the legitimacy of judicial
review is far less acute in South Africa than in the United States.
President Mandela put to rest any lingering doubts about the legitimacy of
judicial review when the Constitutional Court, in one of its first judgments,
held that the death penalty was unconstitutional under South Africa's new
Constitution.91 The decision was divisive, and Deputy President F.W. de Klerk,
expressing the wide support for the death penalty among the country's white.
population, denounced the Constitutional Court's decision and called for a na-
tional referendum on the subject. President' Mandela responded in a
characteristically shrewd yet sage fashion. Speaking directly to de Klerk and the
country's population in a televised address, Mandela stated that he had no
problem with a referendum on the death penalty so long as another question
was added to the ballot: whether the white population should return all the
land that had been taken from indigenous Africans. This response effectively
quelled any talk of referenda to overturn unpopular court decisions. Mandela's
message was clear: we live in a constitutional democracy now, where the Con-
stitutional Court exercises the power of judicial review-and we accept the
legitimacy and the validity of the court's decisions.92
In its judgments, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has exercised the
power of judicial review cautiously, with a distinct appreciation of the enormity
of the challenges that are faced by the executive and the legislature in South Africa.
A case in point is the TAC case, 93 where the Constitutional Court ordered the
90. As of July 2009, the South African Constitution has been amended on sixteen occasions. See
Republic of South Africa, Government Communication and Information Stystem
(Department), "Amendments to the Constitution," online: <http:llwww.info.gov.zalviewl
DynamicAction?pageid=612>. Three of the amendments were enacted in 2009. For a review
and analysis of the prior thirteen amendments, see ibid at 2.46-2.47.
91. SeeStatev. Makwanyane and Mchunu, [1995] 6 B. Const. L.R. 665 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.).
92. This episode is related by Ronald Dworkin in Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer, eds.,
Judges in Contemporary Democracy: An International Conversation (New York: New York
University Press, 2004) at 34-35. See also Jonny Steinberg, "Judges Shrug in Bemusement"
in Notes tom a Fractured Country (Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2007) 247 at
247 (noting that the Constitutional Court struck down legislation in 2003 that
disenfranchised prisoners; Steinberg also relates that "President Thabo Mbeki said he did not
think it right that all prisoners vote, but that the court's decision must be respected").
93. Minister of Health and others v. Treatment Action Campaign and others, [2002] 10 B. Const.
L.R. 1033 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.).
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government to provide anti-HIV drugs to pregnant women, but refused the re-
quest to grant a structural order that would have maintained court supervision
over the development and implementation of government health policy in this
area. To some, the Court's deference to the ANC government has rendered its
performance a source of disappointment." To others, this simply reflects the
recognition that the courts have a limited ability to effect significant social change.
Still others see the Court as out of touch with the country's high crime rate.
In sum, South Africa consciously adopted judicial review under its Consti-
tution and created a new Constitutional Court entirely dedicated to this
responsibility. Judicial review operates in a completely different context in
South Africa than in the United States.
C. ISRAEL: JUDICIAL REVIEW WITHOUT A CONSTITUTION
Israel's constitutional status has long been anomalous, and it is deserving of its
own colour on any constitutional map. Israel's constitutional history has been
marked by continued debate over whether to adopt a formal written constitu-
tion. A constitution is a means both of expressing universalist and particularist
values, while accommodating tensions between them. Israel, however, has never
been able to reach the necessary level of consensus on how to accommodate these
94. There has been significant criticism of the Constitutional Court's social and economic rights
jurisprudence. See e.g. Marius Pieterse, "Resuscitating Socio-Economic Rights:
Constitutional Entitlements to Health Care Services" (2006) 22 S.A.J.H.R. 473; David
Bilchitz, "Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations
for Future Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence" (2003) 19 S.A.J.H.R.1 at 8-10; D. Brand,
"The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence, or 'What are
Socio-economic Rights For?"' in Henk Botha et al., eds., Rights and Democracy in a
Transformative Constitution (Stellenbosch: Sun Press, 2003) 33; F. Coomans, "Reviewing
Implementation of Social and Economic Rights: An Assessment of the Reasonableness Test
as Developed by the South African Constitutional Court" (2005) 65 Heidelberg J. Int'l L.
167; Sandra Liebenberg, "South Africa's Evolving Jurisprudence on Socio-economic Rights:
An Effective Tool in Challenging Poverty?' (2002) 6 L. Dem. & Dev. J. 159; and Marius
Pieterse, "Possibilities and Pitfalls in the Domestic Enforcement of Social Rights:
Contemplating the South African Experience" (2004) 26 Hum. Rts. Q. 882. For other,
more general criticisms about the deference of the Constitutional Court to the executive, see
David Dyzenhaus, "The Past and Future of the Rule of Law in South Africa" (2007) 124
S.A.L.J. 734; Dennis Davis & Michelle le Roux, Precedent and Possibility: The (Ab)use of Law
in South Africa (Cape Town: Double Storey Books, 2009) 117.
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competing values.9" Israel's constitutional history, its political and legal culture,
and its constitutional structure have created an environment in which the Ques-
tion of Legitimacy operates quite differently than it does in the United States.
Israel is atypical in that judicial review preceded the recognition of a consti-
tution. Consequently, the dominant issue in Israel has been the constitutional
one, and judicial review has been a second-order issue. Since the early to mid
1990s, the defining issue in Israeli constitutional politics has been-and con-
tinues to be-judicial activism, with judicial review being but one of several
issues that fall under this rubric.
After achieving independence in 1948, Israel deferred the adoption of a
formal constitution, electing to build its constitution chapter by chapter
through a series of "Basic Laws." For the next five decades, scholars focused on
questions such as "what was the status of the Basic Laws?" "What was the au-
thority of Israel's Parliament to enact constitutional legislation?" "Did the
Supreme Court have the power of judicial review?"96 During this time, in the
absence of a formal bill of rights and judicial review over legislation, Israel's Su-
95. But see Michael Mandel, "Democracy and the New Constitutionalism in Israel" (1999) 33
Isr. L.R. 259 at 274 [Mandel, "Democracy"] (arguing that the failure to adopt a constitution
in Israel was attributable to "the hegemony of labour at the helm of a strong state and the
relative weakness of capital").
96. See George M. Gross, "The Constitutional Question in Israel" in Daniel J. Elazar, ed.,
Constitutionalism: The Israeli andAmerican Experiences (Lanham: University Press of
America, 1990) 51 at 70. On these questions, see Amnon Rubinstein, "Israel's Piecemeal
Constitution" (1966) 16 Scripta Hierosolymintana 201; Claude Klein, "A New Era in
Israel's Constitutional Law" (1971) 6 Isr. L. Rev. 376. On the issue of judicial review, see
Melville B. Nimmer, "The Uses of Judicial Review in Israel's Quest for a Constitution"
(1970) 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1217; Eliahu Likhovski, "The Courts and the Legislative
Supremacy of the Knesset" (1968) 3 Isr. L. Rev. 345; and Aharon A. Bergman, "The
Supremacy of the Knesset: Further Comment on the Election Finance Law Case" (1971)
6 Isr. L.R. 117. See also Eliahu S. Likhovski, Israel's Parliament: The Law of the Knesset
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) at 73-103. In this work, Likhovski also addresses the
Kness&t's authority to enact constitutional legislation (at 216-23). On this matter, see also
Ruth Gavison, "The Controversy Over Israel's Bill of Rights" (1985) 15 Isr. Y.B. H.R. 113.
These issues were considered by the Supreme Court in the Gal Law decision, infra note 98.
Whether they were resolved, however, is another matter. Because a determination of these
issues was not necessary to the resolution of the case, the Court's 519-page examination may
be the longest example of obiter dicta in history.
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preme Court developed a "judicial bill of rights."97 The Supreme Court thus
exercised judicial review without a constitution, under certain "entrenched"
provisions of several Basic Laws. The recognition of judicial review under a
constitutional document, however, did not take root until 1995.
In a 1995 decision,98 the Supreme Court declared that Israel had a consti-
tution, that this constitution -was largely contained in Israel's Basic Laws, and
that the Supreme Court had the power of judicial review over legislation-and
could therefore strike down laws that were inconsistent with a Basic Law.99
Having thus assumed the power of judicial review, the Supreme Court of Israel,
as of October 2007, has only exercised it to strike down legislation on six occa-
sions since 1995. This response is not for want of opportunity, however, as the
Supreme Court of Israel hears thousands of cases each year.' Judicial review in
Israel is always controversial, but that is more a consequence of its rarity than of
its frequency.
97. Gary L. Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold: Constitutionalism in Israel and the United States (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1993) at 11-12.
98. See United Mizrachi Bank plc v. Migdal Cooperative Village (1995) 49 (iv) P.D. 221 [Gal
Law case] in Omi, ed., "Cases: Leading Decisions of the-Supreme Court of Israel and
Extracts of the Judgment" (1997) 31 Isr. L.R. 754 at 764-802 (includes a partial English
translation and an editorial commentary). For a complete English translation of the case, see
United Mizrahi Bank Ltd., et al. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, CA 68 21/93, [1995] Isr. L.R.,
online: Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/93/210/
068/z01/93068210.z01.pdf>.
99. Ibid.
100. In 2005; over 12,000 petitions were filed with the Supreme Court. See Judicial Authority,
Annual Report 2005 (Jerusalem: 2006) at 11 (in Hebrew), online: <http://elyonl.court.gov.
il/heb/info/DochRashut2005.pdf>. The numbers of cases heard by the high courts of the
other countries that are discussed in this article are typically in the double digits, although
they might at times break a hundred. On Canada, see Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of
Proceedings: Special Edition - Statistics 1998 to 2008 (Ottawa: Supreme Court of Canada,
2009), online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/stat/pdf/doc-eng.pdf>. On the Constitutional
Court of South Africa, see Michael Bishop, "Constitutional Court Statistics for the 2005
Term" (2006) 22 S.A.J.H.R. 518 at 518-19 (noting that the Court delivered 24 judgments
in 2005, 22 judgments in 2004, 25 in 2003, 34 in 2002, 25 in 2001, 28 in 2000, 19 in
1999, 21 in 1998, 20 in 1997, 27 in 1996, and 14 in 1995). On the United States Supreme
Court, see Supreme Court of the United States Blog (SCOTUSblog), "SCOTUSblog End-
of-Term 'Super StatPack' - OT06," online: <http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/
archives/SuperStatPack.pdf> (the U.S. Supreme Court decided 68 cases for the October Term
(OT) 2006, 71 cases for OT 2005, 76 for OT 2004, 74 for OT 2003, and 73 for OT 2002).
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Simply put, judicial review is not the question of legitimacy in Israel that it
is in the United States. In Israel, the question is concerned with the Supreme
Court's activism; judicial review is only one element in this larger issue. The
heated debate on judicial activism and the legitimacy of the Supreme Court of
Israel preceded Israel's 1995 constitutional "moment" and has continued there-
after. Far more important and controversial has been the Supreme Court of
Israel's exercise of judicial review over administrative action and political deci-
sions, as well as the expansion of the Court's jurisdiction and the doctrine of
standing.' The debate-and the questioning-of the Court's legitimacy is
very much about what Michael Mandel and others would term "the legalization
of politics."" 2
In 2007, Israel's reform-minded Justice Minister, former law professor
Daniel Friedmann, embarked on a campaign to limit the power of the Supreme
Court. In a wide-ranging interview in August 2007,"3 Friedmann listed his
targets as: (1) curbing excessive prosecutorial zeal against politicians, (2) lack of
oversight in certain prosecutorial decisions of the Attorney General, (3) inter-
vention by the High Court in political appointments, (4) questions of
justiciability, (5) the process for selecting justices and the composition of the
Judicial Election Committee, (6) the need for a legislative override of court
decisions, (7) the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, (8) limiting the scope of
the judicial doctrine of "reasonableness," and (9) the role of the Chief Jus-
tice.' From this varied and extensive list, it is possible to get a sense of the
range of the debate over judicial activism in Israel, and how the exercise of
judicial review-and the reactions thereto (such as mooting the introduction
of a legislative override)-are simply one element in a much larger debate.
101. See e.g. Shimon Shetreet, "Standing and Justiciability" in Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat,
eds., Public Law in Israel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 265; David Kretzmer, "The
Supreme Court and Parliamentary Supremacy" in Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat, eds., Public
Law in Israel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 303; and Ruth Gavison, Mordechai
Kremnitzer & Yoav Dotan, Judicial Activism: For andAgainst - The Role of the High Court of
Justice inIsraeli Society (Jerusalem: Magnus Press, 2000) (in Hebrew).
102. See Mandel, "Democracy," supra note 95.
103. Orit Schohat & Ze'ev Segal, "Saving the High Court from Itself' Ha'arets (18 August 2007).
104. Ibid.
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IV. CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF UNIVERSALIZING
JUDICIAL REVIEW
In mapping comparative judicial review, we need to recognize the limits of uni-
versalizing the Question of Legitimacy from the particular American experience.
If we do not, we risk replicating some of the 'perceptual biases that were captured
in my teacher's Cold War Map. As North American comparative constitutional
law scholars, we are prone to exaggerate the significance of judicial review
because of the strong influence of American doctrine on the subject. We need
to understand the constitutional system "from the inside"" 5 in order to accurately
map out judicial review comparatively. We need, in other words, to be able to
accurately depict the phenomenon of judicial review in each system before
mapping the larger phenomena 'comparatively. Schor is quite careful in rec-
ommending a contextual approach; he is consistently critical of polar theories-
that is, single-explanation theories for the rise of judicial review and other related
phenomena. He rightly states that comparative constitutional law is an enterprise
in which scholars seek to lay bare the foundations of constitutionalism.
In mapping judicial review, we need to distinguish between judicial review
and the larger phenomena of the global expansion of judicial power. The global
expansion of judicial power refers to "the infusion of judicial decision-making
and of court-like procedures into political arenas where they did not previously
reside. To put it briefly, we refer to the 'judicialization' of politics."' 6 Judicial
review is one element: judicialization from without. There are also other forms
of judicialization from within."°7 As noted in the Israeli case, 108 we need to dis-
tinguish between constitutional judicial review and administrative judicial
review. One possible remedy can be found in my first map, the one that I saw
in the Mapparium in Boston. In that map, ocean depths were noted by darker
and lighter shades of blue. We need to use a similar system of conceptual shad-
ing in looking comparatively at judicial review in countries around the world.
105. See Giinter Frankenberg, "Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law" (1985) 26
Harv. Int'l L.J. 411.
106. Torbjorn Vallinder, "When the Courts Go Marching In" in C. Neal Tate & Torbj6rn
Vallinder, eds., The GlobalExpansion ofJudicial Power (New York: New York University
Press, 1995) 13 at 13.
107. See ibid. at 16.
108. Gal Law case, supra note 98.
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Carl Friedrich wrote that "[c]omparative constitutionalism seeks to de-
termine the theoretical presuppositions and institutional manifestations of
constitutional systems."' 9 American politics is "notably Constitution centred,"1
and fixated on the Question of Legitimacy. While the United States provided the
prototype for judicial review that many other countries have consciously adopted,
it is a mistake to assume that the debate surrounding its legitimacy has necessarily
migrated with it. Each system that has adopted judicial review has done so in its
own manner. The American debate over the Question of Legitimacy is a useful
framework for probing the particular narrative of judicial review in a given juris-
diction, but it should not subvert that analysis. Cappelletti mused that the
solution to the mighty problem is to be found in "a given society's history and
traditions, the particular demands and aspirations of that society, its political
structures and processes, and the kind of judges it has produced."" In the case
of comparative judicial review, there is a limit 'to where an American map can
lead us.
109. Carl J. Friedrich, Limited Government: A Comparison (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1974) at 11.
110. See Martin Shapiro, "The United States" in Tate & Vallinder, supra note 106, 43 at 43.
111. Cappelletti, supra note 45 at 411-12.
